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But whoever has the greatest number of  the good things I  have 
mentioned, and keeps them to the end, and dies a peaceful death, 
that man, my  lord Croesus, deserves in my  opinion to be called 
Look to the end, no matter what it is you are considering. 
Solon’s response to Croesus, who asked, Who is the happiest man? 
Herodotus, Hisrories, book 1 
happy. 
Longevity is a cornerstone of modem conceptions of the good life. Although 
the desire for a long life is not unique to modern times, the expectation that 
most  people will  live  beyond  sixty-five  years  of  age is a  phenomenon of 
twentieth-century industrialized nations. Mortality rates at the turn of the cen- 
tury, when life expectancy was about fifty years, implied that only about four 
of ten newly born American children could expect to survive to age sixty-five. 
By 1989 nearly eight of ten could expect to reach sixty-five (National Center 
for Health Statistics  1992). Yet if the happiness of a life is judged by its end, 
these impressive gains in longevity are a mixed blessing.  Even  if they have 
financial security,  none who live to advanced ages can escape the risk that 
they will suffer years of discomfort, disability, and dependence before they die. 
Those whose final years are marked by  infirmity do not keep to the end the 
“good things” that Solon identified as part the happy life-among  them sound 
body, health, and “freedom from trouble.” They suffer from the disabling ef- 
fects of diseases and injuries that medical treatment can neither cure nor fully 
relieve. 
Thus of the three aims of medical care in the old maxim, “To cure seldom, 
to relieve  often, to comfort always,” only comfort is achievable. Long-term 
care is the chief means of providing such comfort. Individual, family, and soci- 
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ety have long shared responsibility for long-term care, in a shifting and uneasy 
balance. Different views about both the feasibility and appropriateness of an 
expanded public role in providing and financing long-term care are at the cen- 
ter of American debates about long-term care policy, which is only one conten- 
tious aspect of broader deliberations about reforming health care. Long-term 
care carries special significance, though, because the people who use long- 
term care are often helpless, always dependent upon others, and unlikely to 
return  to  full  health  and  function.  For  many  of  them,  long-term  care  is 
a necessity, and for others, it ameliorates the effects of  mental and physical 
decline. 
Notwithstanding differences in the goals of care, in important respects long- 
term care is similar to other health services. Like hospital and physicians’ ser- 
vices, it is designed to ease the burden of illness. The federal government in- 
sures a substantial fraction of  the care, which is also expensive-the  average 
cost of  a year in a nursing home is about $20,000 in the United States, and is 
higher if Medicaid-financed stays are excluded. But long-term care fundamen- 
tally differs from other health  services. The population  that uses it is more 
sharply circumscribed,  limited  mainly to the severely  disabled elderly. And 
although  survival is sometimes difficult  or impossible  without  it, long-term 
care is never lifesaving in the same sense that, say, emergency surgery follow- 
ing an automobile accident can be. Nonmarket services play an important role 
in long-term care, which is a close substitute for nonhealth services, such as 
housing and food. Much of the care is basic and humanitarian-such  as shel- 
ter, food preparation, and assistance in walking and personal hygiene. 
It is the mode of  financing, however, that most clearly sets long-term care 
apart. Private  long-term care insurance developed slowly and never became 
popular. The near absence of private insurance has been blamed as the funda- 
mental shortcoming of long-term care financing, while the wide dissemination 
of insurance is regularly cast as the culprit responsible for uncontrolled growth 
in expenditures for physicians’ and hospital services. The wider adoption of 
private long-term care insurance has the potential to bring to long-term care 
the very problems that health care reform is designed to solve, and it is unlikely 
to address all the real and apparent deficiencies  of long-term care financing. 
The recognition that the failure of private insurance is not accidental must tem- 
per any hope that private insurance can be the sole means of reducing risk 
and improving access to long-term care. Nevertheless, I will argue that it is a 
promising approach to better risk protection for those persons in situations in 
which it is most appropriate. 
The central conceptual questions confronting policies toward long-term care 
financing are common to all social insurance: how should any (government) 
policy  balance  insurance,  savings,  and  redistributional  features,  and  how 
should it relate to private activities? I briefly discuss below the political conse- 
quences of  redistributive policies, but most of my comments address the mix 
between savings and insurance, and public and private financing. I will argue 
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size increased private savings. Savings alone will not be enough; because a 
small fraction of the elderly account for most long-term care expenditures, the 
savings required  to self-finance such care might result  in undesirably  large 
bequests for many of the elderly. Furthermore, the poor and near-poor elderly 
lack the assets and income needed to save for long-term care or to purchase 
insurance. Finally, increased savings, or indeed any reform of financing long- 
term care, is not a panacea, and some of the most vexing problems of long- 
term care have little to do with financing. The poor quality of  some nursing 
homes, for example, has less to do with financing than with the inability to 
monitor the quality of care and the weak incentives some nursing homes have 
to improve quality. Policies designed to encourage individual savings will not 
solve every problem yet, I will argue, should be central to reform efforts. Ex- 
panded  insurance,  for example,  is unlikely  to be successful  as the principal 
mode of financing long-term care; the costs would be insupportable if insur- 
ance were not coupled with savings features, and an insurance approach that 
controlled costs might deter the development of promising alternatives to tradi- 
tional forms of long-term care. Financing universal long-term care insurance 
from public dollars hardly seems feasible today, and circumstances will not be 
more favorable in the coming years. 
5.1  The Basic Facts of Long-Term Care 
5.1.1  What It Is 
The constellation of services that compose long-term care range from lim- 
ited home-based  assistance to comprehensive care in an institution. The ser- 
vices are frequently targeted at the specific physical and/or mental limitations 
of the patient but, in contrast to most medical care, are rarely aimed at a spe- 
cific disease. They aid in coping with the irreversible consequences of one or 
(more often) multiple diseases, rather than curing them. Although not all long- 
term care is of indefinite or even prolonged  duration-nursing  home admis- 
sions can be brief, particularly when they aid in convalescence from an acute 
illness or operation-even  patients who use long-term care for brief periods 
usually need it because chronic diseases and disabilities delay or impede their 
recovery from an acute condition. 
Long-term care is traditionally delivered either in institutional (inpatient) or 
community settings. Institutional services are most prominent and account for 
the bulk of expenditures. This category includes skilled nursing (certified by 
Medicare to provide an appropriate range of medical, nursing, and rehabilita- 
tive services), intermediate care (offering a narrower range of professional ser- 
vices), and custodial facilities (basic housing and related services for persons 
whose disability is severe and irreversible), along with a variety of other insti- 
tutional arrangements, such as hospices (for terminal care) and board and care 
homes, which provide meals but no professional  services. In  1985 about  1.3 
million, or 4.6% of all Americans sixty-five years of age and older, could be 146  Alan M. Garber 
found in  a nursing  home at any time (National Center for Health Statistics 
1994, 193). 
Community-based long-term care encompasses a diverse set of services, in- 
cluding home health care from a visiting nurse or physical therapist, respite 
care, home meal preparation or delivery, day care programs, and a host of other 
services. Many such formally designated home health services are covered by 
insurance programs. The number of elderly Americans receiving some form of 
paid home health services approached one million in 1992 (Strahan 1993). 
Modern developments have blurred the distinctions among these categories 
of  long-term  care, and even distinctions  between  long-term  care and  acute 
medical  services.  For  example,  socialihealth  maintenance  organizations 
(SHMOs) add nursing home and related long-term care services to standard 
medical  care  benefits  offered  by  prepaid  capitated  health  plans.  Besides 
applying capitation to long-term care, this approach allows the health mainte- 
nance organization (HMO) to internalize long-term care, reducing the distor- 
tion in trade-offs between covered and noncovered services. Congregate living 
arrangements,  such  as life care communities or continuing care retirement 
communities, combine housing and other services with features of long-term 
care  insurance.  These  facilities  charge  high  prices  for  entry,  along  with 
monthly fees that are typically higher than condominium fees but may also pay 
for board and long-term care services if the member requires them. The ser- 
vices, and housing, are matched to the needs of the member, so in some of the 
communities the person  may move from a fully independent existence in an 
apartment, then to a facility that provides limited support services, and finally 
to a nursing home, all without leaving the congregate setting. Although other 
forms of  senior housing  rarely  offer the full array of  services of a life care 
community, most facilities provide some assistance, such as meal preparation, 
whether  or not they explicitly incorporate  insurance features. Such arrange- 
ments can make assisted living more attractive. Unlike typical nursing home 
admissions, which remove the disabled elderly from friends and often spouses, 
the continuum of care available in some life care communities makes it pos- 
sible to remain in a nearby building despite deterioration in one’s health. Fur- 
thermore, they can better integrate home health and institutional services. 
Perhaps the most important form of long-term care, “informal” (nonmarket) 
home services, is measured  poorly  and does not appear in national  income 
accounts. The National Long-Term Care Survey, which was administered to a 
random sample of Americans  sixty-five years of age and older, revealed that 
19% of Medicare recipients  had functional  impairments expected to last at 
least three months (Macken 1986), of whom 90% received some form of assis- 
tance from family members (Rivlin and Wiener  1988). Spouses and children 
(usually adult daughters) of the disabled elderly may spend many hours each 
day preparing meals, helping them to eat, bathe, and walk, and even helping 
them to the toilet. Family members who provide such care often reduce their 
own hours of paid  work or leave the labor force. A study of informal home 
health services for terminally ill cancer patients reported that family members 147  Social Responsibility for Long-Term Care 
provided  ten  hours of  care daily,  and  that  one-third  of  the  caregivers  who 
worked at the outset of the care episode dropped out of the labor force. Even 
if the patient received hospice care as an outpatient,  though, the terminal illness 
caused about 22% of the caregivers to leave their jobs. In this study, caregivers 
who continued working lost $605 per episode of illness, and those who left the 
labor force lost $2,582 (Muurinen  1986). Because few hospice patients  live 
long, the income forgone for the care of the disabled elderly who are not in the 
final stages of a terminal illness is likely to be far greater. When such support 
is no longer available or sufficient, whether through the death of a spouse, the 
exhaustion of a daughter, worsening disability, or supervening illness, nursing 
home admission often results. 
5.1.2  Utilization 
Discussions of long-term care policy often focus on the more than one mil- 
lion elderly Americans in nursing homes and, to a lesser extent, the million or 
so who use paid home health services. But about four million elderly Ameri- 
cans receive informal assistance for chronic impairments. Although they may 
not generate expenditures for long-term care, they are at risk of doing so. Lim- 
ited evidence suggests that the (age-adjusted) functional status of the elderly 
is improving along with life expectancy. As the baby boom grows older, how- 
ever, there  will  be  a dramatic increase  in  the  number of  people who have 
reached the ages at which disability is common. The cohort effect is so large 
that it is likely to overwhelm any improvement in age-adjusted disability rates, 
stimulating an increase in the use of both formal and informal long-term care. 
Most research on long-term care utilization has focused on its most expen- 
sive component, nursing homes. Three questions relevant to long-term  care 
insurance predominate in the literature: who is likely to enter a nursing home, 
what is the distribution of utilization, and to what extent do other (lower-cost) 
forms of long-term care substitute for nursing homes? A smaller literature ad- 
dresses the issue that may be most critical to long-term care insurance:  how 
price sensitive is demand? 
Predictors of Utilization 
Important predictors of institutionalization are advanced age, limitations in 
the ability to carry out one or more basic “activities of daily living” (ADLs), 
cognitive impairment,  and the absence of  a spouse or children  who provide 
care (Wingard, Jones, and Kaplan 1987). As it happens, similar characteristics 
also predict mortality. Although the frail elderly may live with functional im- 
pairments  for many  years  before  they  die, disability  is  associated  with  in- 
creased mortality. And as death nears, utilization of long-term care increases. 
As is well known, utilization of hospital and physicians’ services increases in 
the last year of life. The same appears to be true of nursing home utilization, 
as Anne Scitovsky (1988) reported in a study of Palo Alto residents. In analyses 
of the National Long-Term Care Survey and the National Nursing Home Sur- 
vey, Thomas MaCurdy and I (1992) found a similar pattern: in the final year of 148  Alan M. Garber 
life, the very old use nursing homes much more heavily than do survivors of 
the same age and sex. Entry to a nursing home, then, is commonly  an event 
that occurs in the last stages of life. These observations account for one of the 
difficulties in identifying people likely to enter nursing homes: those who ap- 
pear to be at very high risk of institutionalization  often die before they  are 
admitted or soon thereafter.  One of the most important  randomized  trials of 
interventions  designed  to prevent  institutionalization  focused on a group of 
elderly individuals whose disabilities were thought to place them at extremely 
high risk of entering  a nursing home; instead,  very high death rates caused 
nursing  home  utilization  in  the  control  group to fall short  of  expectations 
(Kemper 1988). 
Distribution of Utilization 
The skew in the distribution of nursing home utilization, combined with its 
substantial cost, would seem to make long-term care insurance highly attrac- 
tive. A sizable minority of Americans who reach age sixty-five can expect to 
enter a nursing home sometime before they die (Kemper and Murtaugh  1991; 
Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy 1994).  Most admissions are brief, but a small frac- 
tion  of the people who enter  account  for most  nursing  home care. Keeler, 
Kane, and Solomon (1981) were among the first to explore the mix of long- 
and short-stayers in nursing homes; they found that long-stayers were far more 
likely to have diagnoses of mental disorders and senility, while short-stayers 
tended to have diagnoses of fractures and cancers. According to our analyses 
of  more  recent  national  cohorts of  the  elderly,  although  fewer than  1% of 
Americans  are in nursing homes at age sixty-five, 35% can expect to enter a 
nursing home (Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy 1994). Our results, presented  in 
table 5.1, show that most admissions are brief. A smaller minority, however, 
will have very long stays. The 90th percentile  of nursing home utilization is 
seventeen months for men and twenty-nine months for women. 
Substitution and Price SensitiviQ 
Of fundamental importance to long-term care policy are two questions about 
utilization: how well do noninstitutional services prevent or substitute for insti- 
tutionalization, and how price sensitive is the demand for nursing home care? 
If home services are close substitutes for nursing home care, they might enable 
people to remain in the community and delay, if not prevent, institutionaliza- 
tion. Institutionalization is viewed as both an expensive and unattractive living 
arrangement.' The right set of services, delivered at the right time, might fore- 
I. Most estimates of the cost of nursing home care include expenditures for nursing home care 
but not savings that result from entry, which primarily  accrue from reduced housing expenses. 
This approach may be valid for short stays but not for prolonged institutionalization. The typical 
nursing home patient was living alone before admission; if she is permanently institutionalized, 
by definition she no longer uses housing outside the nursing home. Savings on housing expenses 
partially offset nursing home costs. Furthermore, many patients require around-the-clock observa- 
tion or care, which likely costs far less when delivered in an institution than in the community. 149  Social Responsibility for Long-Term Care 
Table 5.1  Simulations of Nursing Home Utilization Rates 
Mean  5%  10%  25%  Median  75%  90%  95% 
Number of nursing home admissions  1000  0  12 
Male  1000  0  11 
Female  1000  0  12 




Nursing home utilization for those 
with at least I  admission (months) 
Male 
Female 








600  0  0 
900  0  0 
21  I  1  2  6 
16  1  1  I  4 
25  1  I  2  9 
14  1  I  1  3 
I1  1  I  I  2 
17  1  I  1  3 
208  43  67  129  204 
186  38  61  115  183 






































Source: Dick, Garber, and MaCurdy forthcoming. 
stall nursing home admission. If  effective, lower-cost substitutes for nursing 
home care were available, one might think that the elderly and their families 
would take advantage of them, especially because many of them would ini- 
tially bear the full cost of nursing home admission. Of course, the cognitive 
impairment that is common among the disabled elderly might make it particu- 
larly difficult to locate appropriate home health services. But a review of the 
best-designed  trials of home health care suggests an alternative explanation: 
home care does not  serve as a close substitute for nursing  home care. The 
review concluded that home care services have no impact on mortality, func- 
tional status, or nursing home utilization (Hedrick and Inui 1986).  People who 
are admitted to  nursing  homes may  simply need so much assistance  that it 
is prohibitively expensive or infeasible to provide the services at home. The 
Channeling Demonstration was perhaps the most prominent trial of the impact 
of intensified community-based care on rates of  institutionalization. It did not 
test home care directly,  but  rather the assignment of  a case manager  to the 
patients in the intervention group. The case manager was given the responsibil- 
ity for ensuring that patients  would receive the full range of home services 
that might benefit them, with a view toward improving function and avoiding 
institutionalization. Case management increased the utilization of home health 
services, patient satisfaction, and overall costs, but did not prevent institution- 
alization, death, or the deterioration of other aspects of health (Kemper 1988; 
Thornton, Dunstan, and Kemper 1988; Wooldridge and Schore 1988). 
Studies like these, which indicate that home health services are poor substi- 150  Alan M. Garber 
tutes for nursing homes, suggest that the price elasticity of demand for nursing 
home care is small. Some policy positions assume that this is the case. Nursing 
home stays are feared and widely seen as unpleasant, a last resort for an indi- 
vidual whose condition is so hopeless and needs for care so great that neither 
family  nor formal home care services can provide them. The major goal of 
insurance coverage for long-term care, according to this view, is redistribution 
of the costs of care, not increased utilization. 
On the other hand, because it shares so many of their characteristics, nursing 
home care would seem to substitute for housing and personal health services. 
Furthermore, the price of nursing home care, especially relative to the opportu- 
nity costs of informal care, would seem at the very least to affect the timing of 
admission  and sometimes its overall  duration. The limited  literature  on the 
demand for nursing  home care suggests  that  demand  is moderately  price- 
elastic. Chiswick (1976), in an analysis of regional data, estimated the surpris- 
ingly large price elasticity of -2.3.  Thomas MaCurdy and I found that nursing 
home discharge rates  were highly  sensitive to changes in the daily  subsidy 
implicit in Medicare rules (as Medicare payments phased out over the course 
of an admission), supporting the contention that demand is likely to be highly 
price sensitive (Garber and MaCurdy  1992). Price sensitivity may not charac- 
terize all segments of the elderly population; for example, in our work we dealt 
only with Medicare-covered  nursing home admissions, which are deemed at 
the outset to be short-term rehabilitative stays. Individuals who are admitted to 
nursing homes for substantially  longer, with irreversible  limitations  in their 
ability to carry out routine tasks, may not be able to alter their demand substan- 
tially in response to changes in price. 
5.1.3  Financing 
Comparison of the sources of financing for long-term care and for all other 
personal health expenditures, as displayed in table 5.2, reveals the unique pat- 
tern of long-term care: even though government payers account for a substan- 
tially greater proportion of expenditures for long-term care, the lack of private 
long-term care insurance means that the fraction of nursing home expenditures 
borne directly by the elderly as out-of-pocket expenditures is 43%. In contrast, 
out-of-pocket payments account for only about 20% of other health expendi- 
tures. 
Some long-term care is mixed in other categories of health expenses. Fore- 
most among these categories  are home health  services, which  totaled about 
$9.8 billion in 1991.  About 87% of home health care was reimbursed by third- 
party payers, primarily the federal government. 
To understand how there could simultaneously  be concerns that public in- 
surance for long-term care is inadequate and that government expenditures for 
the same purpose are excessive, it is necessary to understand the basic rules 
under which the two major federal health insurance programs, Medicare and 
Medicaid, reimburse long-term care. Table 5.2  Sources of Payment for Nursing Home and All Other Personal Health Care (percentage of total expenditures, 1991) 
Total, Billions  Private Health  Other  Total 
1991 $  Out-of-Pocket  Insurance  Private  Government  Medicare  Medicaid 
Nursing home care  59.9  43.1  1.1  I .9  53.9  4.4  47.4 
Personal health expenditures, excluding  600.3  19.7  34.8  3.7  41.8  19.6  11.3 
nursing homes 
Source: Adapted from Letsch et al. 1992 152  Alan M. Garber 
Medicare Coverage of Long-Term Care 
Nearly all elderly Americans are enrolled in Medicare, which covers hospi- 
tal and physician expenditures. Although it is primarily an acute-care insurance 
program, it pays for home health services and, under specific circumstances, 
nursing home care. Medicare coverage is designed to encourage nursing home 
use only as a substitute for hospital care, which Medicare would need to reim- 
burse. It is not designed to ensure against prolonged institutionalization. Ac- 
cording  to  a leading  Medicare  benefits  guidebook,  “inpatient  services in  a 
skilled nursing facility are an extension of inpatient hospital care, at a lower 
level of care than provided in a hospital but  still requiring  ‘skilled’ nursing 
or rehabilitation services” (CCH Business Law Editors 1994). To qualify for 
Medicare reimbursement, an admission must satisfy several restrictions. Medi- 
care pays only if  the nursing home is a certified  skilled-nursing facility, the 
admission meets a prior hospitalization requirement, the nursing home stay is 
for the treatment of the condition that was treated in the hospital, the admission 
is certified by a physician, and a utilization review committee does not disap- 
prove the stay. 
If all of these conditions are met, Medicare will pay the full cost for the first 
twenty days of nursing home care during a benefit period. From day twenty- 
one through day one hundred, Medicare imposes a copayment. Often private 
supplemental “medigap” policies pay  for some or all of the copayment, but 
seldom do they extend coverage  beyond one hundred  days, when  Medicare 
coverage  ends. These limits  mean  that  Medicare  pays  at  least  part  of  the 
charges for a substantial fraction of short-term nursing home admissions, but 
accounts for a small fraction-4.4%  in 1991-of  nursing home expenditures. 
Medicaid 
Medicaid’s role in long-term care reflects two defining characteristics: it is 
jointly  administered  by  states and the federal government, and eligibility is 
based on need. Because the states have considerable discretion in administer- 
ing the program,  eligibility  and coverage  rules  vary  by  state (Ruther et al. 
1991). Most of the elderly who receive Medicaid benefits qualify on the basis 
of extraordinary health expenses, under the “spend-down” provision of many 
state Medicaid programs. For states that have such a provision, Medicaid eligi- 
bility  is determined  by  an asset test  and  an income test; the latter requires 
income minus health expenditures to fall below  133% of the income level for 
welfare eligibility. One or a series of nursing home admissions usually account 
for the health expenditures for the middle-class elderly who spend down to 
Medicaid eligibility. That is why Medicaid pays for nearly half of all nursing 
home expenditures  and, conversely, why  nursing homes account for such a 
large fraction of Medicaid expenditures. National estimates of the fraction of 
nursing home admissions that lead to spend-down range from 14 to 18%, with 
about  17% of patients admitted to nursing homes spending down within six 153  Social Responsibility for Long-Term Care 
months (Rice 1989;  Adams, Meiners, and Burwell 1993).  Although the popular 
image is one of catastrophic expenses suddenly leading the middle-class  el- 
derly to lose much of what they own before qualifying for Medicaid, the usual 
situation may be different. According to Sloan and Shayne (1993), most of the 
disabled elderly  who spend down are already  near poverty  at the time they 
enter a nursing  home. Furthermore,  assets can be transferred  as well as de- 
pleted. 
By transferring  assets to children and other relatives, the elderly can pre- 
serve wealth when they expect to face substantial out-of-pocket  copayments 
for either medical or long-term care. Medicaid eligibility rules not only contain 
strong incentives for such behavior, but have several other consequences. For 
example, in several states, the asset limits place the spouses of  the disabled 
elderly at risk of impoverishment. Joint assets are subject to the spend-down, 
so the spouses can lose liquid assets and their homes. Newspapers reported the 
spectacle of  long-married  elderly  couples divorcing  in  order to protect  the 
assets of the (relatively) healthy  spouse. Thus the elderly  who live in states 
with a medically needy category of Medicaid eligibility  have free insurance 
against the costs of prolonged institutionalization, but qualifying for Medicaid 
is usually unattractive. Medicaid is also criticized as a long-term care insurance 
program because its expenditures for the elderly became unavailable for the 
care of the poor, particularly  poor children, who are the program’s intended 
beneficiaries. 
Private Long-Term Care Financing 
Most private financing comes in the form of out-of-pocket payments, medi- 
gap insurance, and private long-term care insurance. Out-of-pocket payments 
are considerable; the other sources of private financing are not. Medigap insur- 
ance usually covers Medicare copayments  and deductibles, and may pay for 
some of the medical expenses that Medicare does not reimburse (such as phy- 
sician fees that exceed the Medicare allowed charges, or expenditures that ex- 
ceed maximum Medicare reimbursement) but infrequently  covers prolonged 
nursing home admissions. Private long-term care insurance is designed for this 
purpose. It is a topic of perennial interest to insurers and policymakers, but for 
reasons I discuss below, the interest has not been reflected in sales of the poli- 
cies (Van Gelder and Johnson  1991; Rivlin and Wiener 1988). 
5.2  What Happened to Private Long-Term Care Financing? 
The existing combination of private and public financing of long-term care 
has few champions. Current modes of financing provide the wrong  kind of 
protection  from risk, and, at least according to advocates of expanded long- 
term care services, the balance of federal coverage for health care of the elderly 
is too heavily weighted  toward  hospital  and physicians’  services. The most 
striking feature of long-term  care financing, however, is not a small federal 154  Alan M. Garber 
role, but the near absence of private insurance coverage. Many proposals for 
reform  call for federal initiatives to promote  private insurance, or to create 
federal insurance that  would  complement private  long-term care insurance. 
Whatever the mix of federal and private financing, though, the key issue is why 
private insurance markets have been slow to develop when public  long-term 
care financing is so roundly condemned as inadequate. 
Common explanations for why consumers have failed to purchase long-term 
care insurance include the availability of Medicaid as an alternative, high price, 
and restrictive benefits (Pauly  1990). Medicaid  is likely to be an  important 
substitute for private insurance; although eligibility requires asset transfer or 
depletion for the middle-class and wealthier elderly, Medicaid is essentially a 
compulsory insurance  program  that  assures  payment  for extended  nursing 
home stays. Indeed, private insurance is unlikely to be attractive to those who 
are not very well off, because they give up little to become eligible for Medic- 
aid benefits. The wealthy, on the other hand, are likely to self-insure. Only 
people whose assets are neither too small nor too large would be candidates 
for private insurance. They might choose not to purchase because the policies 
provide too few benefits for the costs. Explanations for the limited penetration 
of private insurance and the unattractiveness of the policies that are available 
emphasize disincentives to insurers, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and demographic uncertainty. 
Affordability, never a precise concept, is especially imprecise in this con- 
text, depending as it does on the timing of purchase  and liquidity  of assets. 
Certainly the cost of an actuarially fair policy can be well beyond the means 
of an elderly widow who lives alone and suffers from multiple disabilities. And 
like a patient who tries to buy health insurance after falling seriously ill, she is 
unlikely to find an insurer willing to sell a low-cost policy. Another aspect of 
affordability  is the ability to pay: older people tend to have substantial asset 
wealth and relatively little income. Many of their assets-particularly  housing 
wealth-are  illiquid, so it may be difficult to draw upon assets for direct pay- 
ments for long-term care or for insurance. Reverse annuity mortgages and re- 
lated programs have been developed to draw upon housing wealth to pay for 
living needs, but have not been very popular. Such mortgages may hold little 
appeal for the large fraction  of the elderly who seem not to wish  to reduce 
their housing equity (Venti and Wise 1990). 
Insurers also face severe disincentives to marketing  long-term care insur- 
ance. According to the conventional wisdom, which developed from limited 
survey evidence, the elderly do not purchase  private  insurance because they 
are unaware that Medicare does not cover long-term care. This explanation is 
puzzling,  since insurers who thought  the market would be profitable should 
have found it worthwhile to disseminate the information themselves. Further- 
more, publications  describing coverage rules are widely distributed. It seems 
more likely that the insurers had doubts about the profitability  of the market. 
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inefficiencies that have characterized health care insurance are magnified. Bro- 
chures for long-term care insurance show the consequences for buyers: many 
policies offer thin coverage and rigorous exclusions. Potential purchasers often 
eschew such policies because they question their value, not affordability. 
Absent universal coverage, insurers  and providers  that bear  risk, such as 
prepaid health plans, will find it difficult to overcome adverse selection unless 
they impose restrictions on coverage or limit sales to people too young to need 
long-term care. Poverty, lack of social supports, and functional disability are 
important  risk factors for institutionalization. Although insurance companies 
may partially observe these characteristics, the beneficiary or family member 
who purchases the policy knows more about the health status and level of func- 
tion. Any party that indemnifies, reimburses services, or directly provides care 
faces these same problems. 
To minimize adverse selection, most insurers adjust premiums for observ- 
able risks. They also impose waiting periods, exclude coverage for preexisting 
conditions, or exclude from coverage common conditions that may be difficult 
to detect in early stages. Presumably  a woman at age forty or fifty has little 
information about her future risk of nursing home admission, relative to others 
at the same age. At age seventy, she is much more likely than the insurer to 
know whether she is particularly likely (or unlikely) to enter a nursing home. 
Mandatory universal insurance avoids adverse selection, but it does not inev- 
itably reduce the magnitude of moral hazard. In health care, moral hazard is 
usually defined as a price effect, that is, by  paying  a substantial fraction  of 
the cost of medical care, insurance coverage increases the quantity demanded. 
Housing, food, personal services, and other components of long-term care are 
of value to nearly all the elderly, not only those who are particularly disabled 
or who suffer from a specific disease. The broad value of such services makes 
it more likely that a price subsidy will increase demand for long-term care than 
for  physicians  and  hospital  services, which  are  targeted  toward  treating 
disease. 
Even if the demand for care were inelastic in the short run, the adoption and 
diffusion of more costly new medical technology or the wider application of 
existing technology could increase long-run expenditures for the treatment of 
specific conditions. Thus, as the price to the consumer (the copayment) falls, 
the quantity demanded rises, and the long-run effects are likely to be magnified 
by technological change. 
Traditional fee-for-service health insurance relies heavily on deductibles and 
copayments  to reduce  utilization.  But this approach has fallen into disfavor, 
largely because most Medicare recipients reinsure for the copayments and de- 
ductibles, and because very extensive cost sharing appears to be necessary. If 
anything,  even  a  small  insurance-based  subsidy  for housing,  for example, 
might be  sufficient to increase  demand. Payers  do not rely  on  cost sharing 
alone. They also assess individuals on a case-by-case basis to determine their 
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process  of  determining “medical necessity”  for a particular  patient  can be 
costly. Insurers adopt an analogous approach to long-term care, screening the 
enrollee for limitations in ability to carry out routine physical tasks and other 
factors to ascertain that a genuine “need” for long-term care exists. Such proce- 
dures are widely used and apparently have some value, but assessment of the 
need  for  long-term  care  services  is  at  a  primitive  stage. It  relies  heavily 
on subjective reports by  the family and the enrollee, who have incentives to 
obscure disabilities  when  seeking to buy  insurance, and to emphasize im- 
pairments when they seek reimbursement. For many acute medical services, 
laboratory tests and other measures that are less subject to direct manipulation 
by the enrollee are available to help determine medical necessity. Comparable 
measures are seldom available for long-term care. Thus, despite the many in- 
struments payers can employ to limit its effects, moral hazard is likely to re- 
main a significant challenge to any mechanism for insuring or providing long- 
term care. 
Some analysts argue that uncertainty  about potential liability has deterred 
many potential  insurers from offering long-term care policies. Insurers have 
had limited experience marketing and administering  such policies, the argu- 
ment  runs,  and there  is substantial uncertainty  about the  length of  life and 
trends in the disability of the elderly. Demographic projections are, of course, 
subject to uncertainty, and even the sign of the trend in age-specific disability 
is controversial. Many long-term care insurance plans allow individuals to pay 
premiums that vary with the age at initial enrollment, like renewable term life 
insurance. If the elderly live longer but age-specific levels of  disability do not 
diminish, insurers will face unexpected liabilities. Furthermore, if spouses and 
children provide less care for disabled elderly in the future, the demand for 
paid long-term care services will grow. On the other hand, it should be possible 
to reinsure or otherwise mitigate the risk of larger-than-expected  claims for 
long-term care. Furthermore, many insurers limit potential claims by setting a 
daily maximum payment and an upper limit on months of coverage. 
If consumers expect government bodies to offer long-term care insurance in 
the near future, they may conclude that the public program  will  obviate the 
need for any  private  policy  they buy. If  this is an important  reason  for the 
reluctance of elderly Americans to purchase long-term care insurance, it is one 
that some insurers have already addressed. Some plans have arrangements to 
refund premiums if government policy creates insurance with similar coverage 
for all elderly Americans. 
Private long-term  care insurance may  become an important  source of  fi- 
nancing despite the limited role it has played so far. Private insurance became 
more attractive in the late 1980s, when many plans eliminated prior hospital- 
ization requirements for nursing home admission and promised benefits for a 
longer period. Exclusions for such conditions as Alzheimer’s disease and for 
preexisting  conditions became less common. Finally, a greater proportion  of 
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tures undoubtedly contributed to their rising popularity. The Health Insurance 
Association of America reported that in 1988 the number of companies selling 
long-term  care insurance  was  six times the number  in  1984. By December 
1988 an estimated  1.1 million policies had been sold. It may be several years 
before growing enrollment is reflected  in the share of payments  covered by 
insurance, especially  if  the purchasers are in relatively  good health. Thus it 
seems likely that private long-term care insurance, which was unattractive  to 
purchasers  because  it  paid  benefits  only under  a restrictive  set  of  circum- 
stances, will  become  an increasingly  important means of  financing  nursing 
home care in the next decade. 
Despite the prospect of continued growth, private insurance is unlikely to 
provide  the majority  of financing for long-term care in the near future. The 
costs due to adverse selection can be minimized if insurance is purchased dur- 
ing working  years, so private insurance could have had an expanded role by 
the time baby boomers have aged. According to simulation estimates from the 
Brookings-ICF long-term care financing model, at most 58% of all the elderly 
early in the next century could be covered by private long-term care insurance 
purchased during working years. Insurance purchased after retirement would 
cover fewer people (Rivlin and Wiener 1988).  Private insurance, unless subsi- 
dized,  is  also unlikely  to  finance  care for low-income,  high-risk  men  and 
women, like many Medicaid enrollees. 
5.3  Limits to Expanded Public Financing of Long-Term Care 
An expanded government role is the cornerstone of many proposals for re- 
form of long-term care financing. Some of the proposals extend well beyond 
financing-they  would broaden regulatory powers to monitor and improve the 
quality of nursing home care, for example. Poor quality of care is one of many 
problems that long-term care reform might address; it is difficult to detect be- 
cause many patients are incapable of complaining or making their complaints 
felt, and concerned family members have few opportunities to assess quality. 
As important as such issues may be, financing is the centerpiece of most pro- 
posals that  would expand federal involvement in long-term care. Federal fi- 
nancing would yield the most direct route to achieving universal coverage. The 
middle-class elderly, who stand to lose substantial assets if they need nursing 
home  care,  might  find  universal,  federally  sponsored  insurance  appealing, 
while the poor and near poor, who have less to lose in qualifying for Medicaid, 
would be little affected. 
If the federal government takes an expanded role, it would most likely be as 
part of a “private-public  partnership.” A typical arrangement would have pri- 
vate insurance pay  for the first year of  nursing home care, and  government 
programs pay for any nursing home care exceeding one year. All such propos- 
als, even if they assume that much of the funding will remain private, need a 
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substantial redistribution, and just as funding issues frustrated the most ambi- 
tious recent health care reform plans, they may prove insuperable obstacles to 
large increases in the federal share of long-term care expenditures. 
Who will  pay  for expanded  coverage?  In  discussing this  question, I first 
consider shifting some of the costs from the elderly to the working-age popula- 
tion,  or to future  generations,  and  then  consider  “budget-neutral”  funding, 
meaning the generation that receives the coverage pays for its full costs through 
a combination of premiums and taxes. 
5.3.1  Intergenerational Redistribution 
The funding  mechanisms  for long-term care might  either  involve deficit 
spending (shifting the costs to future generations) or increased taxes on the 
current working-age population. I will not comment on the desirability or con- 
sequences of deficit funding to finance long-term care, except to say that nei- 
ther  today’s  political  climate  nor  tomorrow’s  economic  environment  favor 
deficit financing for a new entitlement for the elderly. 
Funding long-term care for current Medicare beneficiaries out of taxes im- 
posed on the currently employed population would increase an already large 
subsidy that is unlikely to be maintained when current workers grow old. De- 
spite high  rates of poverty, the economic  well-being  of  the elderly has im- 
proved absolutely and in relation to other demographic groups. For example, 
between  1970 and 1984 median incomes for families headed by  persons be- 
tween twenty-five and sixty-four years old barely changed, rising from $29,113 
to $29,292 (in  1984 dollars). During the same period, median  incomes for 
families headed by persons sixty-five years of age or older rose from $13,522 
to $18,236 (U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging 1985-86,  57). By  1992 
the median income of married couples sixty-five years of age and older had 
reached $23,817 (Grad 1994,36).  According to Hurd (1990), in 1987 the mean 
household income of the elderly was about 63% of the income of households 
of all ages, and the average wealth in  1979 was $147,000 (including federal 
benefits; wealth was about $80,000 excluding Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid).  Census statistics placed  1988 median  net  worth  at $73,000 for 
households whose head was age sixty-five and older, about twice the median 
net worth for all households (U.S.  Senate Special Committee on Aging 1991). 
As the recipients of indexed Social Security benefits and rising Medicare pay- 
ments who also live longer than previous cohorts, the elderly receive far more 
in benefits than they contributed to Medicare and Social Security. According 
to one set of estimates, a new retiree in  1990 could expect to receive $4 in 
Medicare payments for every $1 paid in taxes and premiums (Center for Health 
Economics Research 1994, 21). 
Though they are far more likely to be ill and require health care than other 
segments of  the population, the elderly have already attained near-universal 
coverage for hospital and physician  services. In 1989 about three-fourths of 
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both Medicare and Medicaid. Fewer than  1  % lacked health insurance, as com- 
pared with about 16% of the rest of the population (National Center for Health 
Statistics 1992). Their health insurance does not completely protect them from 
risk, for Medicare is not fully comprehensive; it does not cover prescription 
drugs, and although its hospital and physician benefits are extensive, they are 
subject to a ceiling. In a study of the disabled elderly, Liu and colleagues esti- 
mated that catastrophic health care expenses were about as likely to be due to 
acute care as to nursing home care. They calculated that about 9% of disabled 
elderly persons with  an income between  $500 and $1,000 per month would 
have acute-care expenses exceeding  15% of income, and that about 8% and 
3% of them would have comparable out-of-pocket expenses for nursing home 
care and drugs, respectively  (Liu, Perozek, and Manton 1993). Thus universal 
health insurance does not guarantee comprehensive protection from financial 
risks that result from poor health. Nevertheless,  other broad segments of the 
population completely lack coverage, and it seems unlikely  that incremental 
federal dollars would first go to expand benefits for the elderly. 
Working in favor of funding long-term care from tax receipts today is the 
size of the current cohort of working-age Americans relative to retirees. The 
size of the cohort, however, also makes it unlikely  that any such policy will 
be sustainable. 
The support ratio captures the salient demographics  in simple terms. The 
elderly support ratio (one hundred times the ratio of persons age sixty-five and 
over to working ages) is projected to rise from about twenty-one (currently) to 
forty (in 2030), as the total support ratio (elderly and children under age twenty 
as percentage of the size of the working-age population) increases from 70 to 
90. As the support ratio rises, only large and sustained productivity  gains will 
make it feasible to rely on current taxation to finance programs for the elderly. 
The demographic shift coincides with the financial crises that both Medicare 
and Social Security face early in the next century.* 
If  current trends continue, even if there is no expansion of long-term care 
benefits, the shift in the age composition of the population will dramatically 
increase health expenditures. Between  1950 and  1990 the number of Ameri- 
cans sixty-five years of age and older rose from  12.2 million to 3 1  .O million; 
by  2030, according to census projections, their number will more than double 
again, to 69.8 million. In 1990 the elderly were about 12.5% of all Americans; 
by 2030 they will be just over 20% of the population. In 1987 per capita health 
expenditures were $5,360 for Americans sixty-five years of age and older and 
2. The trust fund crisis will first  affect Medicare Part A; the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, 
which funds Part A, will only be able to pay benefits for about seven more years. The Old-Age 
and Survivors’ Insurance Trust Fund is projected to be able to pay benefits for about another thirty- 
six years with the reallocation to the Disability Insurance Trust Fund that Social Security Trustees 
recommend (Social Security Bulletin  1994). Medicare Part B, which is funded from the Supple- 
mentary Medical Insurance Trust, is financed on a year-to-year basis, so is not directly subject to 
the depletion of trust funds. It is funded by  a combination of  premiums that enrollees pay and 
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$1,286 at younger ages. Thus there will be dramatic growth in the age group 
that uses about four times as much health care as the general population. 
In fact, the age shift may  have greater  effects than  these figures  suggest. 
Population growth will be concentrated at advanced ages, when health expen- 
ditures are greatest. About half a million Americans in  1950 were the “oldest 
old,” people eighty-five  years of  age and older. By  1990,  1.2 million  were 
eighty-five years and older, and by 2040 there are projected to be 13.2 million 
Americans in this age group (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993). Above sixty- 
five years of age, expenditures continue to rise with advancing age; per capita 
expenditures were $3,728 at ages sixty-five to sixty-nine and $9,178 at eighty- 
five years and older. Simple actuarial projections of health expenditures, based 
on recent rates of growth in per capita expenditures by age, imply that health 
expenditures  for the elderly will grow to untenable levels early in the next 
century, and will exceed $1 trillion by 2030 (Garber and MaCurdy  1992). Ev- 
ery serious health care reform plan proposes to avert the deepening crisis in 
health expenditures by slowing the growth of spending for hospital and physi- 
cians’ services. Unless and until expenditure  growth is held to “acceptable” 
levels, there will be substantial political resistance to adoption of any new ben- 
efits, including long-term care. 
Even without broader coverage, long-term care expenditures will grow dra- 
matically. Nursing home utilization and expenditures rise at an even steeper 
rate with age than overall health expenditures. Per capita nursing home expen- 
ditures increase more than twenty-fold between ages sixty-five and eighty-five, 
averaging $165 at ages sixty-five to sixty-nine and $3,738 at eighty-five years 
and older; they are about $46 for Americans between ages twenty and sixty- 
four (Waldo et al. 1989).  Over the past decade or so, age-specific nursing home 
utilization appears to have declined slightly. However, the effects of the shift 
in the age distribution of the American population will expand the number of 
nursing home residents, even if the trend toward lower risk of institutionaliza- 
tion continues. 
Why might  the risk of institutionalization  continue  to decline? New evi- 
dence suggests that age-specific disability rates are declining. In a controver- 
sial 1980 article and subsequent writings, James Fries proposed that there is a 
natural limit on the attainable life span, and that more and more people will 
live to the maximum life span. Thus survival curves will approach the rectan- 
gular, rather than developing a longer and thicker tail of very old survivors. 
Along with the rectangularization of survival, Fries claimed, will come a com- 
pression  of morbidity: people  will spend less time sick and disabled before 
they die. His claims were hotly debated. It seemed obvious that, just as medical 
care might diminish morbidity and improve function, it would also keep alive 
people who either had disabilities or were likely to acquire them. For example, 
improved treatment of congestive heart failure might enable people with the 
condition to live longer, albeit with severe activity limitations. Many authors 
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example, Verbrugge [  19841 and Poterba and Summers [  19871). Poor data made 
it difficult to test Fries’s hypothesis in any convincing way; most of the evi- 
dence was indirect, and there was little longitudinal data with appropriate mea- 
sures  of  functional  status  or  morbidity.  A  recent  publication  by  Manton, 
Corder, and Stallard (1993), based on analysis of three waves of the National 
Long-Term Care Survey, offered some of the most convincing evidence that 
age-adjusted functional status has indeed improved over time. Although their 
data  covered  only  a  seven-year  period  during  the  1980s, Manton  and  col- 
leagues showed that fewer nondisabled elderly became disabled (on an annu- 
alized basis) between  1984 and  1989 than between  1982 and  1984. Further- 
more, people with disabilities were less likely to acquire new disabilities in the 
second time period. These intriguing results have yet to be confirmed using 
other data, but even if they are correct, the decline in morbidity seems unlikely 
to be sufficiently large to offset the increases in the demand for both medical 
care and long-term care that will result from the aging of the baby boomers. 
Thus, even if general funds could pay for long-term care of the elderly today, 
any such approach offers only a temporary solution, since the burden of subsi- 
dizing  the care of elderly baby  boomers  will  be heavier  and  will  fall on a 
smaller population of working adults. 
5.3.2  Can Current Beneficiaries Pay? 
If  redistribution across generations is infeasible, what are the prospects of 
financing from the population that currently receives benefits? One approach 
that might appeal to the elderly is to finance expanded long-term care benefits 
by reducing Medicare outlays for hospital and physician services; it is unlikely 
that they would choose to have nearly all Medicare dollars go toward conven- 
tional medical services, as they do now. However, many of the elderly believe, 
perhaps with good reason, that any savings resulting from a cutback in medical 
expenditures would be used to reduce Medicare outlays, not to fund new bene- 
fits. In any case, the results of efforts to reduce Medicare expenditures, includ- 
ing the Prospective Payment System (designed to limit hospital costs) and the 
Resource-Based  Relative Value  Scale (designed  to reduce  expenditures  for 
professional fees), have been disappointing. 
An alternative mode of intragenerational financing imposes a combination 
of taxes and subsidies on current Medicare beneficiaries. Such approaches pre- 
serve budget neutrality and exploit the large variance in the economic status of 
the elderly. A similar strategy resulted in the passage of a modest expansion of 
Medicare benefits in the late 1980s. That experience undoubtedly contributed 
to the caution with which Congress has approached health care reform under 
the Clinton administration. 
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 was the culmination of an 
ambitious effort to extend Medicare benefits to long-term care and prescription 
drugs. During months of negotiations, the benefits were whittled away, until 
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It liberalized the dollar limits on payments for inpatient and physicians’  ser- 
vices, and added a prescription-drug benefit, whose deductible was set so high 
that only a small minority of Medicare recipients would actually receive pay- 
ments. It also included a slight expansion in long-term care coverage, raising 
the limit from 100 to  150 days of nursing home care per benefit period, and 
eliminating the requirement that hospitalization had to precede covered nurs- 
ing home admissions. To  preserve budget neutrality and to ensure that all the 
elderly would be covered, the act included a subsidy for the low-income el- 
derly and a surtax for those with high incomes. According to a Congressional 
Budget Office report, in 1989, when premiums averaged $145, the program’s 
benefits were worth $62 per enrollee. The maximum surtax, which made the 
total cost about fourteen times the expected value of the benefits, applied to 
anyone whose income exceeded $35,000.  Although the act was criticized from 
some quarters because it did not go far enough in covering long-term care, the 
most devastating attack came from politically active elderly individuals who 
faced a large surtax to pay for benefits that most already received as part of 
private  supplemental  health  insurance. Their protests,  which  embarrassed  a 
number of congressmen and the leadership  of the American Association  of 
Retired Persons (AARP), led to the repeal of the act before its full implemen- 
tation. 
5.4  Making Long-Term Care More Broadly Available 
Private solutions to financing long-term care remain largely unproven, and 
government approaches, at least for the foreseeable future, will have limited 
scope. Do these observations imply that there are no sustainable approaches to 
improving  access to long-term care and to reducing  the risk of catastrophic 
long-term care expenditures? I believe that the answer is no, but that the fol- 
lowing considerations are essential to designing improved modes of financing 
long-term care. 
Financing  out of  general  tax  revenues,  or any  means  of  transfer from 
working-age adults to the current elderly, will offer at best transient solutions. 
The large size and inadequate funding of existing entitlement programs  and 
the rising support ratio are sufficient reasons. Resistance to any such approach 
will be particularly severe in the face of  the improved economic status of the 
elderly  and the worsening economic plight of the very  young.  Plans to use 
deficit financing, or to increase taxes on the working-age population, will face 
the general resistance to increases in taxes. They would also increase redistri- 
bution to an age group that already receives substantial benefits from govern- 
ment programs. 
Initiatives  to promote private long-term care  insurance should  emphasize 
purchase many years before disability becomes common. Many private long- 
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premium term life insurance. They are relatively inexpensive for people who 
begin purchasing coverage at a time when the probability  of a claim is very 
low and adverse selection is unlikely to be a significant problem. Adverse se- 
lection is a far more serious problem at advanced ages, when functional im- 
pairment is frequent, because methods to screen for risk factors for institution- 
alization are imperfect. There would be difficulties even if adverse selection 
could be overcome, since actuarially fair insurance would be prohibitively ex- 
pensive for many of the at-risk elderly. 
Financing long-term care by redistribution among the elderly is unlikely to 
be politically feasible. As the history of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage 
Act illustrates, even an immensely popular and modest expansion of benefits 
will meet with severe political resistance if voters perceive that its costs are too 
high. A comprehensive long-term care benefit, particularly if it began covering 
nursing home care early in an admission, would be more expensive than the 
provisions in the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act. The surtaxes needed to 
finance the program would not go unnoticed. Attempts to fold long-term care 
into a more general health care reform effort, as we recently witnessed, may 
make the change more acceptable politically, if only because they obscure the 
relationship  between  program costs and benefits. But unless long-term  care 
benefits are financed by reductions in other benefits, or real efficiencies result 
from the general reform effort, resistance will be substantial. 
Is reform likely to bring new efficiencies that reduce the size of the surtax 
needed to finance expansion of covered benefits? Some have argued that health 
care reform can reduce administrative waste, eliminate inappropriate care, and 
promote more efficient practice patterns. Even if these claims are valid in the 
context of hospital and physician services, they are unlikely to apply to long- 
term  care. Fee-for-service  insurance,  coupled with  tax  subsidies,  is widely 
blamed for inefficiencies and overutilization in the existing market for health 
care. Yet  insurance-induced  distortions, apart from any implicit in the Medic- 
aid program, cannot have had comparable effects on long-term care. In fact, 
many  reform  proposals  seek to duplicate  traditional  fee-for-service private 
health insurance in the long-term care market, making cost reductions and ef- 
ficiency gains particularly unlikely. 
Moral hazard may be a far  more significant problem in developing insurance 
for long-term care than for physicians’ and hospital services. Projections  at 
the time Medicare was passed grossly underestimated  future expenditures. In 
1967, its first full year of operation, total Medicare expenditures  were $4.2 
billion. By 199  1 Medicare expenditures reached $120 billion (Helbing 1992). 
If  only changes in  the  size and composition  of  the beneficiary  population, 
along with general price inflation, had affected Medicare outlays, expenditures 
would have grown far more slowly. Typical projections assume that there is no 
behavioral response to the price subsidy implicit in health insurance, so insur- 
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patients who develop respiratory failure benefit from assisted ventilation in an 
intensive care unit, for example, a reduction in the price the patient pays for 
such services is unlikely to increase demand substantially. 
The long-run elasticity of demand, however, can be much greater than such 
an example suggests. Subsidized care, with the associated increase in ability 
to pay for high-technology services, inexorably led to the development of new 
and expensive modes of health care. In the absence of widespread health insur- 
ance, many of these technologies would never have left the laboratory, or they 
would have been sold at lower prices. Unlike many forms of conventional med- 
ical care, long-term care often substitutes for goods and services that any el- 
derly  person  might  consume, such as housing,  personal services, and food 
preparation. Innovations in housing arrangements for the elderly have increas- 
ingly blurred the distinction between housing and nursing home care; many 
continuing care retirement communities, for example, are designed to provide 
a comprehensive  set of services beginning with pure housing and sometimes 
food  services,  sometimes with  medical  insurance,  and  directly  providing 
graded  levels of  long-term  care. Because the criteria used to determine the 
“need”  for long-term  services are less precise  and more easily manipulated 
than, say, the diagnosis of a heart attack, the close substitutability of housing 
and other services means that  long-term care insurance is likely to increase 
utilization substantially, and that the distortions will be larger than for conven- 
tional medical insurance. 
A  long-term care insurance program that covers noncatastrophic expendi- 
tures will be costly. The usual arguments about the drawbacks of first-dollar 
insurance coverage apply with force here. Many elderly Americans can expect 
to use formal long-term care, and a majority will receive informal long-term 
care at some time. Most will make limited use of such services. Publicly and 
privately financed insurance to cover such expenses will be subject to the costs 
that result  from moral  hazard,  and  adverse  selection  will  raise  the costs of 
privately provided insurance that is sold to the elderly. Such insurance offers 
little risk reduction at high cost. 
Any public insurance program for long-term care is likely to be most suc- 
cessful if it mandates universal participation and restricts coverage to cata- 
strophic long-term care benejits. Even for those who use it heavily, long-term 
care is usually less expensive than hospital and physicians’ services. A small 
fraction  of  people admitted to nursing  homes have  stays  lasting  a  year  or 
longer. Although nursing home charges vary greatly within and between  re- 
gions, the mean cost of an admission, even if it lasts a year, is small in relation 
to the wealth  of many  of the elderly. A program  that financed only greatly 
prolonged  nursing  home stays  would  cost substantially  less than  a marked 
expansion of benefits for conventional medical services, or for first-dollar cov- 
erage of nursing home stays, and many of the elderly could afford to pay for 
the period before coverage began with a combination of savings and private in- 
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Like all other forms of long-term care insurance, the catastrophic coverage 
would be subject to both adverse selection and moral hazard. In every respect, 
however, catastrophic coverage would be much  less vulnerable to such prob- 
lems than would, say, first-dollar or first-day coverage. The linkage of the insur- 
ance coverage to the duration of prior use (i.e., the lack of coverage until a year 
or so of institutionalization)  would mean that only persons who could expect 
to  have very  extensive  and lengthy  nursing home  utilization  would  benefit; 
presumably many of these people could be identified ex ante. 
Not all of the elderly would be able to pay for catastrophic insurance out of 
current income. Below some income and/or asset threshold, individuals could 
continue to be covered in the current Medicaid program, whose expenditures 
would fall as a large fraction of the elderly who “spent down” to qualify for 
Medicaid become eligible to receive catastrophic coverage under the new pro- 
gram. All of the usual issues about phasing in a benefit that is means tested 
arise here: the disincentives to save, the desired degree of progressivity,  and 
methods to ensure the quality of care delivered under the safety net (Medicaid). 
The popularity of private insurance to supplement Medicare suggests that it 
will be difficult to preserve the cost-sharing features of catastrophic long-term 
care insurance. Most Medicare recipients obtain medigap policies, which pay 
all or part of the deductibles and copayments, thereby eliminating the features 
that were designed to prevent overutilization of covered services. Tax deduct- 
ibility of premiums for private policies exacerbate their overpurchase. If  pri- 
vate  supplementary  insurance promoted  overutilization  of  long-term  care, 
long-term care coverage with provider incentives (such as capitation) would be 
an alternative means of controlling expenditures. 
Increased  savings  will be necessary  to ensure adequate funding for long- 
term care. A savings-based approach to financing long-term care has several 
advantages that insurance market reform lacks. One is the development of new 
alternatives to traditional forms of long-term care. Innovations such as continu- 
ing care retirement or life care communities offer a combination  of housing, 
personal, and health  services, and are designed  primarily for the healthy el- 
derly  who would like to be  able to stay outside institutions  if  they become 
disabled. Narrowly  drawn  insurance coverage  would  encourage traditional 
forms of long-term care at the expense of innovations, while broad coverage 
could lead to excessive  moral hazard. Thus private savings mechanisms will 
often lead to more efficient outcomes than expanded insurance, which will lead 
to price distortions. 
There are three major concerns with savings-based approaches: public poli- 
cies designed to increase private savings for long-term care might be unsuc- 
cessful; if successful, they might lead to undesirably large bequests; and many 
low-income workers and the persistently unemployed would be unable to save 
enough money. The major form of tax-advantaged  savings for long-term care 
that  was proposed  during the  1980s, called  the individual  medical  account 
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because so few people participated in IRAs, which were clearly superior from 
the saver’s point of view (funds from IMAs could be spent only on long-term 
care, whereas the proceeds from IRAs could be spent on anything). Increased 
savings could result in undesirably large bequests, and the wealth might not be 
readily annuitized if  long-term care insurance markets are highly imperfect. 
Increased savings among those who are near poverty or already receive income 
support seems infeasible, and for this segment of the population Medicaid is 
likely to remain the principal means of financing long-term care. 
Specific mechanisms  for promoting  savings are beyond the scope of this 
discussion. Increased savings will likely require an increase in the average age 
of retirement and may require  substantial behavioral change. It seems clear, 
however, that insurance for long-term care will remain flawed. Increased sav- 
ings, when  feasible, and particularly when coupled with catastrophic insur- 
ance, may offer the greatest flexibility and limit both risk and moral hazard. 
5.5  Conclusions 
Veneration of the elderly-a  central tenet of both Eastern and Western reli- 
gious and cultural traditions-obliges  family and society to maintain and en- 
hance the well-being of those who are old, particularly if they need assistance. 
Modem industrialized  societies rely heavily  on social welfare programs for 
this purpose. The United States lacks universal health insurance for the rest of 
the population, but it subsidizes insurance for physician services and provides 
all of the elderly with hospital insurance under Medicare. Federal and private 
programs  to  insure  long-term  care  for  the  elderly  are  considerably  less 
well developed than Medicare, though. There is little private insurance, and 
Medicaid  is only available to the poor, the near poor, and those who spend 
down. How can our humanitarian impulses to ensure access to long-term care 
be reconciled  with  the financial,  demographic,  and political  barriers  to ex- 
panding or transforming the government role? 
All of the mechanisms for expanding access to long-term care by changes 
in financing are problematic. There are three major forms of financing: direct 
private payments, private insurance, and government payments. Direct private 
payments lack risk protection, and preparing for such payments  will require 
sizable precautionary savings. Private and public insurance can generate sub- 
stantial inefficiencies, stemming from moral hazard, poor information, and the 
high cost of monitoring. Adverse selection is also likely to affect any insurance 
program that falls short of universal participation. Any broad mandate or gov- 
ernment program could overcome adverse selection, but would have large and 
politically unpopular redistributional components. 
Long-term care is currently financed by a mix of all three approaches, al- 
though private insurance has had a limited role. Its role is likely to grow, espe- 
cially if long-term care insurance plans are marketed to younger populations, 
who are less likely to be subject to adverse selection. The federal role in fi- 167  Social Responsibility for Long-Term Care 
nancing  long-term  care is unlikely to expand substantially, unless funds are 
taken from other programs for the elderly, like Medicare and Medicaid. The 
rapidly  approaching depletion  of the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, the al- 
ready large general revenue contribution to Supplementary Medical Insurance, 
and changing demographic largely preclude the addition of a comprehensive 
long-term care benefit to Medicare, unless offsetting savings can be found. The 
costs would be high, the inefficiencies great, and the likelihood  of funding 
budgetary shortfalls out of taxes or premium payments small. 
These realities suggest that federal policy should emphasize increased sav- 
ings, rather than  direct federal payments for long-term  care. Policy  is most 
likely to succeed if it emphasizes ensuring that the disabled elderly can obtain 
humane care, whether it comes from family members, visiting nurses, or insti- 
tutions. Some will be able to rely on spouses and children for assistance, but 
many  will  eventually  need  formal services. Efforts to  prepare  should begin 
long before this contingency is likely to arise. Government programs should 
promote such efforts, because if today’s workers become disabled when they 
are older, the federal government is unlikely to be able to shoulder a greater 
burden than it does now. Increased private saving and greater participation in 
private  insurance, not a broader package of federal benefits, offer the surest 
protection against the financial consequences of old-age disability. 
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Comment  John B. Shoven 
Alan  Garber’s paper provides  an excellent  introduction  to the economics of 
long-term or nursing home care. There are currently some serious shortcom- 
ings in our system of financing  and delivering quality long-term care in the 
United States. Due to the aging of the baby boom generation, however, these 
problems are going to be magnified many times over within the next fifty years 
or so. Per capita nursing home expenditures grow extremely rapidly with age. 
In 1989, those between ages sixty-five and sixty-nine spent an average of  $165 
on long-term care, while those over eighty-five spent more than twenty times 
as much, at $3,738 per capita. Combine this with the fact that the over eighty- 
five population is projected to increase by  a factor of five over the next fifty 
years, and the topic of this paper takes on immense importance. 
Garber points out in the paper that private insurance is currently only a tiny 
factor in the financing of nursing home stays. At first glance, this is puzzling 
since the need for long-term care appears to be something that should be insur- 
able. The majority  of people will not need long-term care in their lifetimes, 
and even for those who do spend some time in a nursing home, the average 
total time spent is not long and the cost is not too great. However, there is a 
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sizable minority  who will  need care for several years, and for them the ex- 
penses  can  be  overwhelming.  As  Garber  points  out,  however,  on  further 
thought this market  suffers severely from two of the classic insurance prob- 
lems: adverse selection and moral hazard. Undoubtedly, these problems at least 
partially  account for the reason that private insurance is not a big factor in 
this market. 
There are other reasons why private long-term care insurance has failed to 
develop. First, to get around the adverse selection problem, insurance compa- 
nies need to enroll people long before they might need care. However, with all 
of  the  talk  of  the government  providing  long-term  care in  the  future, why 
should individuals give up current consumption for future benefits that may be 
unnecessary? Without checking the overall market for long-term care insur- 
ance, I simply examined the policy offered by Stanford University (provided 
by CNA Insurance, one of the largest participants in this market). In the policy 
offered at Stanford, there is absolutely no provision for what happens if the 
government is covering long-term care by the time the policy holder needs it. 
Second, there often are no inflation adjustments in the policies or guarantees 
that the insurance company will be solvent in the distant future. The Stanford 
plan comes in three sizes, offering maximum daily benefits of $90, $120, or 
$150 (and also maximum nominal lifetime benefits). These all sound reason- 
able for today’s prices, but if the potential enrollees think that they might need 
nursing home care sometime in the 2030s, these payouts might be totally inad- 
equate. The Stanford plan mentions making adjustments (to both cost and pay- 
outs) with future inflation, but  there are no specifics whatsoever.  Third, the 
policies  cannot be  actuarially  fair.  The  Stanford policy  charges  men  and 
women the same amount; one visit to a nursing home where the population is 
between 75 and 80% women would hint that a single pricing policy cannot be 
in the interest of male participants. Fourth, a significant fraction of people are 
myopic, particularly  about unpleasant  events in the very distant future. And, 
fifth, the policies are very expensive. I calculated how much money one could 
accumulate if  one put  aside the long-term  care premiums beginning  at age 
thirty-five and earned a nominal return of 7.5% on the money. By age eighty 
(not far from the median age of entry into nursing homes), the account would 
have grown sufficiently to finance a twenty-six month stay at the policy’s maxi- 
mum daily benefit. But Garber’s table  5.1 tells  us that the average  lifetime 
utilization  of nursing homes is only seven months. Even for the 35% of the 
population who will spend some time in a long-term care facility, the average 
utilization is twenty-one months. Clearly, many people would rather take their 
chances than purchase a policy with the actuarial dice so poorly arranged. 
Many of the problems of private insurance provision are fundamental  and 
cannot be solved with either increased government regulation or increased pri- 
vate competition. It is probably safe to say that privately purchased insurance 
will never be a major factor in this market. Some of the problems, particularly 
the moral hazard problem, also apply to government-provided insurance. I per- 171  Social Responsibility for Long-Term Care 
sonally find persuasive Garber’s suggestion that the demand elasticity for nurs- 
ing home care is substantial because the services provided substitute for meals 
and housing expenses. A high demand elasticity translates directly into a very 
large moral hazard problem in this market. 
It is not at all clear that the solution for long-term care financing is to try to 
expand the role of either private  or public  insurance.  If  we had even more 
widespread  insurance than we do now (and Medicaid is already a very large 
factor in this market, paying roughly half of the total bill in the economy), the 
moral hazard problem could become as severe as it is in the rest of the health 
care industry. That is, the age-specific demand for nursing home care could 
increase substantially if more people are put into a situation where they or their 
family don’t pay the incremental costs of their usage. Given the demographic 
outlook for nursing home demand, we cannot afford to have even higher age- 
and sex-specific usage. 
Garber ends the paper with an analysis of alternative policies for long-term 
care financing. None of them will easily deal with the rapidly increasing popu- 
lation over eight-five, of course. Expanding either public or private insurance 
seems both implausible and undesirable, given the moral hazard problem. The 
option that bears further exploration in my opinion is the combination of gov- 
ernment provision of catastrophic  long-term care insurance (for stays longer 
than one or two years) with individual saving responsible for shorter stays. The 
incentive to save will be viable only if the government refrains from financing 
noncatastrophic  nursing  home stays. Individual  or family responsibility  for 
these costs is a viable option only if the government refuses to help those who 
do not provide for themselves. This Page Intentionally Left Blank